obligation to a Good-in-itself that commands us from beyond our humanity. And each traces this transcendent Good to the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. In this respect, each finds in Judaism the resources to respond to the spirit of nihilism embodied by Heidegger's thought.
Levinas and Jonas, however, find it incumbent on themselves as philosophers not to ground ethics in dogmatic faith. And neither believes he has to, for each argues that the Good is accessible to human experience through creation. Consequently, one does not need to be a Jew or consult Torah -or even believe in God's existence or interpet the world as creation -in order to be held responsible before the tribunal of the Good. Though Torah is the medium of Judaic faith in its particularity, the ethical message of Judaism is universally available in the meaning that our existence reveals on its own terms.
God, one might say, has created the world in such a way that the moral law and our capacity to receive it are part of the immanent structure of creation.
The glaring difference between Levinas and Jonas lies in where they place the Good in creation, and how they explain the relationship between the Good and God. I propose to imagine the steps in a dialogue between Levinas and Jonas, who, so far as I know, never engaged eachother in person or writing after their student years in Weimar Germany. Because both are formidable thinkers, I must introduce each in his own right before the dialogue can begin.
I. Levinas: Jerusalem and Athens
Levinas accuses the entire history of Western ontology "from Parmenides on" of being driven by the urge to bring Being under the command of the thinking self, so that the "Other" (or "Infinite") can be corralled within the horizon of the ego's own cares and possibilities.
2 This sweeping indictment permits Levinas to draw a stark contrast between two roads in Western thought: 1) an avenue originating in Athens -the egoism of ontology, with its penchant for a "totalizing" grasp of Being -and 2) a path, emanating from Jerusalem, that is less travelled by philosophers and that Levinas calls "metaphysics." 3 Following Rosenzweig and Heidegger, Levinas sees modern philosophy not as decisively breaking from ancient Greek thought, but as completing a rationalism that was already at work in Athens. But against Heidegger, who traces that rationalism to Plato's "metaphysics of presence" and tries in his later work to recover the meaning of
Being by turning to pre-Socratic ontology, Levinas joins Rosenzweig in bidding us to walk the path towards Jerusalem before heading for Athens.
The heart's desire of the Jerusalemite, the metaphysician, is not to think Being but to be ethically responsible for the Other, whose very face is received as the locus of God's commandment, "Thou shalt not murder." The face is a vessel of the Torah's prophetic call to give to "the orphan, the widow, the stranger and the poor." The quality of our lives is measured, in Levinas's Judaic tradition, not by our knowledge or authenticity, but by the attention we pay to these Levinas's key idea is that the Other is not just an alter ego, for if he were, then our relationship would be symmetrical: I would be another You, and You another I. Levinas goes beyond Martin Buber's account of the I/Thou relationship by insisting that I am more responsible for you than you are for yourself, and that my responsibility for you is not contingent upon your mutuality. 5 You approach me from a height. You face me immediately, before I face myself. I only face myself -to the extent that I ever do -when I step back in reflection, but by that time I have already been claimed by the commandment to serve your good. Here's how Levinas puts it:
The Other is higher than I am because the first word of the face is "Thou shalt not murder." It is an order. There is a commandment in the appearance of the face, as if a master spoke to me. However, at the same time the face of the Other is destitute; it is the poor for whom I can do all and to whom I owe all. I, whoever I may be, as the "first person," I am he who finds the resources to respond to the call. Within nature, there are subjective goods, but no objective Good-initself, says Levinas, and so no basis for ethical responsibility.
Consequently, the very possibility of ethics demands reference to a supernatural Good: a meaning that reveals itself from "beyond Being"
because it requires one to be able to sacrifice one's interests -and even one's life -for the sake of the Other. Regardless of whether one identifies the Other's face as the trace of God, one is responding to a supernatural summons when one suppresses nature in order to welcome one's neighbor. Our bodies sets the stage for our being able to transcend our nature and condemn "the survival of the fittest" in the name of "Shalom!" And paradoxically, we reveal our spirituality most fundamentally by tending to the material needs of others: the needs of life itself.
Levinas agrees that the ethical message he discerns within the I/You encounter is perhaps best exemplified by Jesus's selfless lovingkindness -and the Biblical paradigm of Levinasian neighborliness is, I believe, the Good Samaritan. But Levinas interprets the Gospels as conveying the same basic lesson that was already present in the Prophets' injunction to give to "the orphan, the widow, the stranger and the poor." Still, Levinas's emphasis on agape -one's exclusive, self-sacrificing exposure to the particular Other one happens to faceseems to conflict with the Prophets' ideal of justice: a moral principle that requires that all Others, and even oneself, as "the Other of Others," be respected equally.
Levinas concedes that love needs justice, Jerusalem needs Athens, because the "third parties" who stand outside the immediacy of the I/You encounter are also one's neighbors. Justice demands that incomparables be compared: that the unique Other to whom one is absolutely devoted be placed within the wider human community and be acknowledged as "only one among others." Justice requires that the conscientious self step back from the immediacy of the one-for-another and adopt a posture of neutrality: treating everyone as having equal rights. Levinas acknowedges that justice is recommended by the Torah itself, but argues that ethical priority lies in mercy (rahamim):
simple acts of generosity. Long before the recently celebrated debate between Lawrence Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan over the relative importance of justice and care, the Judaic tradition has known that a concern with justice's "abstract order of rules" too easily degenerates into an "ideological rationalism" that is forgetful of the unique Other who needs a helping hand.
10
It should come as no surprise to us now that Levinas reads the encounter with God -one's submission before the majesty of the Other who commands from "on high" -into the phenomenology of the interhuman relationship itself. In presenting itself as coming from beyond the world organized around one's own, and even society's, needs, the face of the Other person is the "trace" of the divine. Metaphysics, in
Levinas's sense, is ethics because the Good-in-itself is revealed in the experience of one-for-another. And ethics, in turn, is already religion: because proximity to God can arise only through devotion to the other person. The transcendent is an immanent moment of the ethical relation itself. The personal presence of God resides in the I/You encounter, and love of God resides in love of neighbor.
But isn't faith something above and beyond morality? Levinas relates an anecdote told by Hannah Arendt shortly before her death. Existentialism is no idiosyncracy within modern thought, according to Jonas, but the most complete expression of "the ethical vacuum" caused by two key assumptions of the modern credo: 1) that the idea of obligation is a human invention, not a discovery based on the objective reality of the Good-in-itself; and 2) that the rest of Being is indifferent to our experience of obligation. 18 Jonas challenges these modern assumptions and aims to disclose, in a manner consistent with modern science, "a principle of ethics which is ultimately grounded neither in the authority of the self nor in the needs of the community, but in an objective assignment by the nature of things." 19 Jonas's recovery of the meaning of Being unfolds in three stages: existential, ontological, and theological. Our journey through the first two stages will be brief as I have been asked to focus on the Judaic dimension of
Jonas's thought. 20 My main object is to track how Jonas relates the his Judaic God.
In The Phenomenon of Life, Jonas offers "an existential interpretation of biological facts," arguing that "concern for one's being" is not reserved for Dasein alone, but is present in "an ascending scale" of perception and action among plants, animals and human beings. Value is inherent in nature because organisms must be able to experience value and disvalue in order to survive and thrive.
Jonas worries, however, that a "nihilist" may acknowledge the presence of subjective value in Being yet doubt "whether the whole toilsome and terrible drama is worth the trouble." Our reconstruction of natural history rests on the unprovable assumption that nature's laws remain the same over time: that contingency plays no role in their evolution. And our opinions about human history stand vulnerable to distorted evidence, the most extreme instance of which is the totalitarian effort to rewrite the historical archive. Jonas recounts a conversation with Hannah Arendt in which they imagined that Stalin had succeeded in revising the Soviet historical record to the point where there was no way for future generations to know about the Gulags. Our awareness that statements which meet our evidential standards of "historical" truth may be incorrigibly false attests to our recognition that the concept of truth about the past refers to a perspective that infinitely transcends our own. And, following Descartes's causal argument, Jonas conjectures that our idea of such a mind must have been caused by that mind itself. 25 Jonas agrees with Kant that theological arguments never comprise proofs, but reason must still venture such speculations in order to address two spiritual longings. First, we may hope that the unavoidable question, "How did it all begin?," find an answer in a personal ground:
a caring presence who created the world with the intention of letting creatures arise in its midst who are able to respond to the goodness of
Being. Second, we may hope that nothing good be lost and forgotten:
that there be an eternal memory even of "the gassed and burnt children But there is a price to be paid, for with knowledge and freedom come the power to will and do evil: an unprecedented power in this technological age, given our ability to destroy our species. Still, moral responsibility is the mark of our being made "for" God's image, not "in" it. Among earthly creatures only we can acknowledge the transcendent importance of our deeds: that we are the "mortal trustees of an immortal cause." To God's self-limitation we owe thanks, for this makes room for us to help Him by taking responsibility for our own vulnerable affairs. We are called "to mend the world" for the sake of a caring, suffering and becoming God who is powerless to realize the promise of His creation on His own. concatenations of matter to more complex, unusual forms of life. Life itself appears to be late and rare in the universe, but far rarer is that most inward and self-transcending product of life: the human mind.
Jonas speculates that the upward mobility of the evolutionary recordthough "no guaranteed success-story" -lends credibility to the idea that the cause of the universe was not random. 30 Still, the fate of the divine adventure lies with us, for only we can bear witness to the three pillars of the Judaic faith: 1) that God saw His creation was a Good-in-itself; 2) that God created humanity for His own image; and 3)
that God made known to humanity what is good because His word is inscribed in our hearts. Why does Levinas insist that we can't have both the God of ethical philosophy and the God of rational theology: both "the Other"
and the "almighty being of creation"? I think it is because he identifies rational theology with theodicy, and concludes that the death of this God, pronounced by Nietzsche, has "taken on the meaning of a quasi-empirical fact" given the horrors of the twentieth century.
36
The rational theologian, ensnared in the logic of trying to comprehend the height of the Supreme Being in terms of what it means to be perfectly, is seduced by "the temptation of theodicy" -the fantasy that:
[T]he evil that fills the earth would be explained by a "grand design"; it would be destined to the atonement of a sin, or announce, to the ontologically limited consciousness, compensation or recompense at the end of time. These supersensible perspectives are invoked in order to divine, in a suffering that is essentially gratuitous and absurd, and apparently arbitrary, a meaning and order.
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Although all religion prior to the twentieth century begins with the promise of salvation, according to Levinas, Auschwitz requires us either to abandon God or else obey the moral law independently of the Happy Ending, preach piety without reward, imagine that conscience brings us closer to God "in a more difficult, but also a more spiritual, way than does confidence in any kind of theodicy."
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In keeping with halakhic Judaism, Levinas says a Jew today must make sense of suffering ethically, not by way of rational theology.
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Useless suffering is evil. Insofar as one suffers "for nothing," one suffers not only from something but from suffering itself. Yet evil can gain ethical-religious meaning from compassion: when one makes one's own suffering into suffering for the suffering of others. The only compensation for useless suffering is the occasion it provides for responsibility: for taking on, as one's own, the affliction of another.
But this elevation of the Other neither makes his suffering "for something" by giving it a purpose, nor brings satisfaction to the righteous one, for responsibility requires that one feel ever more accused and take on more and more affliction. The myth of tzimtzum invites theology-without-theodicy, according to Jonas, for God can be imagined "objectively" without our concluding that everything in creation expresses His will and power. Though Levinas remarks that for Bobby "there was no doubt we were men," and he crowns the dog "the last Kantian in Nazi Germany," even if Bobby lacked "the brain needed to universalize maxims and inclinations." hand, Jonas recognizes that if we simply follow our natural passions, sympathetic though they be, we will not be up to the task imposed by his imperative of responsibility, for it requires a level of respect for humanity and future generations that does not come naturally. This is the Kantian moment in Jonas's idea of our ultimate obligation: the requirement of suppressing our natural, present-centered inclinations for the sake of our duty towards a distant future that will not serve our own happiness.
Still, there remains a classical, Platonic/Aristotelean moment in Jonas's ontological Grundlegung, for the Good in light of which we ought to be moved by respect for "the Idea of man" is a natural one, and we can come to feel that our commitment to it represents the actualization of "cosmogonic Eros" and the fulfillment of our largest self-concern, not the sacrifice of it for the Other's sake. Jonas's sense of justice is animated by the Platonic notion that all human individuals share in the Form of humanity and that this Form is a manifestation of the Good. In this regard, then, the cultivation of virtues corresponding to Jonas's ethics for the future should be seen as contributing to the eudaimonia of the person who embodies them.
From Levinas's perspective, of course, this enlargement of selfconcern only betrays the extent to which Jonas has been seduced by Athens -and Socrates's erotic dream of realizing his own good by assimilating himself to the Idea of justice through the exercise of reason -rather than following the unreasonable path of Jerusalem which commands us to be holy: to be moved by selfless love of the Other.
Levinas would be correct to call Jonas a "Greek" when it comes to ethics, for Jonasian responsibility requires not the suppression of our nature for the Other's sake but the completion of our nature in a pious appreciation of the organic whole to which we belong. But Jonas would reject Levinas's judgement that one cannot be a Greek in ethics and a
Jew at the level of faith.
IV. Rapprochement?
On the three fundamental questions we have explored -A) Can
Jews today have a theology without lapsing into a discredited theodicy?, B) Is the Good-in-Itself "Otherwise than Being" or within
Being?, and C) Is ethics against nature or the completion of nature? -Levinas and Jonas appear to be at loggerheads. Levinas believes that
Jews must abandon conceiving of God onto-theologically and should instead approach Him ethically -as "Otherwise than Being" -through the face of the Other person, whose "height" commands me not to murder and even to sacrifice, for his good alone, my natural desire to exist.
Jonas believes that there is and must be a place for theological speculation in Judaism, but that we can intuit the Good-in-itself as the first principle of Being and understand ethics as the completion of nature, once we reject reductive materialism and appreciate nature ontologically.
The deepest root of the ethical difference between our two Jewish thinkers lies in where they locate the disease -the ethical vacuumfor which the appeal to the Good provides the necessary therapy. For
Levinas, the disease inheres in human nature itself which, left to its own devices, tends towards the worst. Levinas is haunted by a world he has known all too well: in which the egoism underlying the social contract has reared its head and made a mockery of the conventional prohibition against murder. Unless murder is forbidden by an authority higher than nature, he worries, no standard allows us to condemn barbarity once the vulnerable cease to be protected by the social contract. Levinas believes we must go further than those who provide an Levinas's ethical response to "the problem of evil" is typical of the halakhic strand of Judaism, but Levinas deviates from the standard version of the halakhic response provided by Joseph Soloveitchik, the preeminent voice of Orthodoxy in contemporary Jewish philosophy. Soloveitchik claims that humanity's task is not to speculatively second-guess God and fruitlessly ponder the metaphysical mysteries of the cosmic economy, but to transform "fate" -the sense that we are caught up in a blind, mechanical dynamism -into "destiny" -a faith that we are creatures of a personal, loving Creator -by our acting to make the world a better place. The theological issue is not "Why evil?" but rather "What obligation does suffering impose on us?" The halakhic answer is to learn from one's own experience of suffering so that one may "mend the world" by empathizing with and helping others who suffer. According to Soloveitchik, it is irrational, from a Jewish perspective, to insist on a rational resolution to the apparent inconsistency between the existence of evil and God's perfection, for human rationality mandates a behavioral, not metaphysical, response to the experience of suffering. Because we are infinitely removed from a God's-eye perspective on the world, our place is not to explain suffering but to make the best of it.
Soloveitchik begs the question, however, for he preserves the metaphysical problem as a problem, even if it is irrational for us to think we can resolve it. He appears to concede that the living God is an omnipotent, unfathomable will who ultimately controls the show from behind the scenes but according to a design we only dimly see. But if God is conceived as "the almighty being of creation," then we cannot avoid holding Him accountable for suffering and evil, even if it is true that He has His reasons that our reason cannot understand. Soloveitchik's answer to the problem of evil amounts to saying, "Don't ask why we suffer; just obey the law." But this answer leaves open the prospect of theodicy: the thought that we suffer for a reason, though it is not our business to know why.
Levinas goes farther, rejecting Soloveitchik's metaphysical problem altogether by refusing to conceive of God in terms of predicates like knowledge, goodness and power, for God's transcendence is signified not by the theologian's Supreme Being who infinitely exceeds our capacity for knowledge, but only by an "otherwise than Being" whose Infinity presents itself as commandment through the vulnerable, yet lofty face of the unique Other person. Our finitude consists not in the inadequacy of our wisdom, power and goodness to measure up to a perfect Lord who would control the economy of Being for the best, but in our subjection to "an infinite and indeclinable authority that does not prevent disobedience, that leaves timewhich is to say, freedom." (Levinas, "Diachrony and Representation," in Entre Nous, p. 175.) For a good discussion of Soloveitchik's views, see Moshe Sokol, "Is There a 'Halakhic' Response to the Problem of Evil?," Harvard Theological Review (92:3, 1999).
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For Levinas on the theological "problem of evil," see both "Useless Suffering" and also "Transcendence and Evil," Levinas's Postface to Philippe Nemo's Job and the Excess of Evil, tr. Michael Kigel (Pittsburgh: Duquesne, 1998). For a thoughtful discussion of this issue, see Richard A. Cohen, "What Good is the Holocaust: On Suffering and Evil," in Philosophy Today (Summer, 1999) . 41 Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, p. 114. 42 Levinas, "From the One to the Other: Transcendence and Time" in Entre Nous, p. 152. 43 Levinas, "Diachrony and Representation" in Entre Nous, p. 177. 44 Levinas, "The Paradox of Morality" in The Provocation of Levinas, p. 176. 45 The distinctively Judaic character of Levinas's critique of rational theology can be brought out by seeing how he both draws on and subverts the later Heidegger's deconstruction of onto-theology. In Identity and Difference, Heidegger contends that "deity can come into philosophy only insofar as philosophy, of its own accord and by its own nature, requires and determines that and how the deity enters into it." (ID 56) Theology becomes onto-theology when it capitulates to the demand of calculative-representational thinking for reasons. The principle of sufficient reason, as a demand for completeness, invites an appeal to God as the ultimate ratio. But the mystery of Being gets reduced to idolatry, Heidegger alleges, when divinity becomes a being that revolves around man's need for reasons. The God of philosophy is religiously useless, according to Heidegger, because "before the causa sui man can neither pray nor sacrifice, neither fall to his knees in awe nor play music and dance." (ID 56) Though Levinas concurs with Heidegger that rational theology assimilates the living God to the theoretical demands of ontology -and ultimately the consolations of theodicy -Levinas would accuse Heidegger of paganism: of deifying Being and altogether effacing God's transcendence. The root of the problem of rational theology, according to Levinas, is not "forgetfulness of the ontological difference between Being and beings," but oblivion to transcendence and the "metaphysical" difference between Being and the Other. In the words of Adriaan Peperzak:
[Levinas attacks Heidegger's effort to] restore a world dominated by the mysterious powers of the sacred. Heidegger's "fourfold" is too small to contain God, and when Heidegger, in his "Letter on Humanism," declares that Being itself must take the initiative to open for us the dimension of the holy or sacred (das Heilige) as a space in which the essence of the divine can unfold, he places "the God and the gods" within a horizon that prevents authentic transcendence. Within the dimension thus indicated only pantheism and polytheism are possible, a divinization of Being and beings, followed by all the violences that belong to idolatry. (Peperzak, Beyond, 35)
By following Nietzsche in unmasking the latent "humanism" -or selfcenteredness -of theodicy, Heidegger believes he has deconstructed the Absolute altogether. But Nietzsche and Heidegger's critique of the God of theodicy frees Levinas to conceive of the transcendent God in ethical, not cosmological terms. Whereas Heidegger rethinks the sacred as a dimension of Being which transcends the enframing function of calculative-representational thinking, Levinas refigures God's height as that trace in the face of the Other that disrupts an ontological account of temporality altogether and puts our ethical responsibility to be our brother's keeper before our ontological responsibility to hear the call of Being. Put otherwise, Levinas places being-for-theOther -to the point of dying for the Other's sake -ahead of our attachment to Being.
Heidegger's critique of "the metaphysics of presence" inaugurated by Plato -according to which the the temporary, changing and contingent realm of beings is grounded in an eternal, unchanging, and necessary supreme being -remains firmly on the Athenian road of Being, as Heidegger seeks to revive authentic thinking at "the end of metaphysics" by recalling us to the ontological difference known by pre-Socratics like Anaximander, Parmenides and Heraclitus. Whereas Heidegger's agreement with Nietzsche that the God of theodicy is dead draws him away from the transcendent God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob altogether, Levinas enjoins us to rethink the meaning of Jerusalem as "ethics without salvation": being-for-the-Other even at the expense of my own desire to be. 46 As for Heidegger's paganism, Jonas contends that his supposedly post-metaphysical move away from a supreme being and towards Being is "metaphysical" after all, because Heidegger's Being is personified as an agent who reveals itself to properly attuned thinkers who are thereby able to become "ventriloquists of Being." In Heidegger's "primal thinking," Jonas writes, thought is the event of the selfclearing of Being, not man's own erring bid for truth. And man is called to be "the shepherd of Being, not of beings." Jonas replies:
